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NOTES
Antitrust-Division of Territory by Competitors in a
Franchise System
The defendant in United States v. Sealy, ITcorporated' was a
corporation that owned the Sealy tradename and licensed small manu-
facturers around the country to make Sealy bedding products. Scaly
was not an ordinary trademark licensor, however, because almost all
of its stock was owned by the manufacturers,2 who completely con-
trolled its day-to-day activities. Nevertheless, Sealy provided a num-
ber of services which were designed to allow the small manufacturers
to compete more effectively against larger bedding producers: it ad-
vertised and promoted the Sealy name on a national basis, rendered
technical and management assistance, and conducted research. It
also worked with the manufacturers to fix retail prices. Finally, it
served as a device whereby each manufacturer could maintain an
exclusive territory in which to sell its product. Sealy licensed only
one manufacturer to make and sell under the Sealy name in a par-
ticular area. In return each manufacturer promised not to make or
sell outside its area.
In the district court the case was tried on the theory that Sealy
and the manufacturers had conspired to fix retail prices and allocate
territory in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 The district
court held that there was a conspiracy to fix prices and enjoined fur-
ther efforts to regulate retail prices except for the use of suggested
retail price lists. The district court also found that there had been no
conspiracy to allocate territory. It found that there were agreements
to allocate territory, but that they were ancillary to a lawful plan of
trademark licensing and therefore reasonable.4
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court the Government
argued that Sealy was a joint venture of the manufacturers and that
1388 U.S. 350 (1966).
'Stock in Sealy, Inc. was owned disproportionately by all of the manu-
facturers, and the corporation was usually under the control of several of
the largest shareholders. Rudnick, The Sealy Case: The Supreme Court
Applies the Per Se Doctrine to a Hybrid Distribution System for Trade-
marked Bedding Products, 57 TRADEMARKI REP. 479 (1967).
'United States v. Scaly, 1964 Trade Cas. 71258 (N.D. Ill.).
4 Id.
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the agreements to divide territory should be viewed as horizontal
agreements among competitors. The United States Supreme Court
agreed. Drawing on the lower court holding that there had been
price fixing, the Court further held that where manufacturers com-
bine to fix prices and use territorial restraints as part of such a plan,
the territorial restraints must be considered per se unreasonable and
unlawful.'
Although the use of a central agency in the form of a corpora-
tion to advertise and market a trademarked product seems to have
been found mostly in the bedding industry, the technique is of gen-
eral interest because it offers a possible way for small manufacturers
to enter a national market. The basic elements of the Sealy or-
ganization are not affected by the opinion. Sealy may still ad-
vertise nationally, suggest retail prices and in general promote the
efficiency of its licensees. But it has been suggested that territorial
limitations are an important part of such an organization.' It will
therefore be of interest to see to what extent agreements to divide
territory are affected by Sealy.
The Government argued that the agreements to divide territory
were horizontal in nature because it desired to take advantage of the
rule that horizontal divisions of territory by competitors is per se un-
reasonable. This rule was recently expressed in White Motor Com-
pany v. United States7 where the issue was whether vertical terri-
torial restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on its dealers were per
se unlawful. In White Motor, the United States Supreme Court held
it would not determine the vertical issue until extensive market evi-
dence should be presented at a trial. Only then did the Court feel a
proper decision could be made whether to use a per se or rule of reason
approach to the solution of vertical territorialization.8 The rationale
of the decision in White Motor is important here because of the com-
parison made by the Court between vertical and horizontal terri-
torial restrictions. It was felt that vertical restrictions might de-
serve rule of reason treatment because a manufacturer could have
strong procompetitive reasons for imposing territorial restrictions.
By contrast, horizontal agreements to divide territory were con-
sidered per se unreasonable because of the high probability of anti-
u 388 U.S. at 357.
' Rudnick, supra note 2.
372 U.S. 253 (1963).
8Id. at 261.
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competitive effects and the low incidence, if any, of good effects.
In Sealy the Supreme Court said it "would violate reality to treat
[the territorial agreements] . . . as equivalent to territorial limi-
tations imposed by a manufacturer upon independent dealers as
incident to the sale of a trademark product. Sealy, Inc. is an instru-
mentality of the licensees for purposes of the horizontal territorial
allocation."' 0
Having found the arrangement in Sealy to be horizontal, it is
striking that the Court did not use the rule that horizontal divisions
of territory by competitors are per se unreasonable." The theory
actually used by the Court was that the territorial division should be
found per se unreasonable because it was part of a per se unreason-
able plan of price-fixing. It was, as stated by the Court, "part of 'an
aggregation of trade restraints' including unlawful price fixing and
policing . . . unlawful under § 1 of the Sherman Act without the
necessity for an inquiry in each particular case as to their business or
economic justification, their impact in the market place, or their
reasonableness.' 2 The fact that the Court used this approach rather
than apply the easily available per se rule against horizontal division
of territory expressed in White Motor may indicate that the Court
did not consider Sealy an appropriate case for that rule. This leads
therefore to the question whether, absent price fixing, the rule of
reason might have been applied to the issue of territorialization
alone.
A strong argument can be made that where competitors of little
market power have franchised and advertised a brand name (and
no price-fixing is practiced), the Court should then treat territorial
restrictions under the rule of reason. At least one writer has noted
that the per se rule expressed in White Motor is derived from a line
of cases in which the competitors were possessed of large shares of
the market and great market power. 13 It was also suggested in an
amicus curiae brief filed with the White Motor case that the per se
rule should not be applied in the horizontal franchise situation where
9 Id. at 263.
o 388 U.S. at 354.
"' Zeidman, The Growth and Importance of Franchising-Its Impact on
Small Business, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1191, 1200 (1967); Williams, Dis-
tribution and the Shermam Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn
and Sealy, 1967 DuxE L.J. 732, 737.
1-2 388 U.S. at 357.
"s Rudnick, supra note 2, at 465.
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no price fixing is involved. 4 The Court paid little heed to this brief
in White Motor, but it may, by way of an interesting dictum in
Secaly, be hinting that it overstated the rule in White Motor:
It is argued . . . that a number of small grocers might allocate
territory among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to use
of a common name and common advertisements, and that this
sort of venture should be welcomed in the interests of competition,
and should not be condemned as per se unlawful. But condemna-
tion of appellee's territorial arrangements certainly does not re-
quire us to go so far as to condemn that quite different situation,
whatever might be the result if it were presented to us for de-
cision.15
The case for application of the rule of reason is also buttressed by
the dissent in Sealy. The dissent argued that the rule of reason
ought to be applied, but hung this conclusion on its view that the
restrictions were vertical in nature. 6 It would seem, however, that
the facts of the case make it more desirable to view the arrange-
ment as horizontal, because Sealy, Inc. was completely dominated by
the manufacturers and had little life of its own. Thus it could be
argued that the real point of the dissent is that in an appropriate case
of territorial division by competitors of little market power and with
a small share of the market, the rule of reason should be applied.
If it is still possible for firms with little aggregate market power
to use territorial division in a franchise system under the rule of
reason, the next question is what factors would be considered in ap-
plying the rule of reason? As to anticompetitive effects, it is clear
that any division of territory will cause some reduction in compe-
tition. Indeed, it has been argued that division of territory is even
more damaging to competition than price fixing, because it eliminates
all intrabrand competition in the sale of the product.Y7 As to pro-
"' Brief as Amicus Curiae, White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
235 (1963). This brief was filed by Serta Associates, a bedding licensor,
to correct a false impression it felt that White Motor Company was making
on the Court. White Motor Company, in an attempt to distinguish between
vertical and horizontal arrangements, had assumed that horizontal territorial
agreements were per se unlawful. Serta attempted to show in the brief that
the rule of reason should be applied. See Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Antitrust and Trade Regulation Today: 1967, at 71.
" 388 U.S. at 357.
11 Id. at 378.
" Brief for Appellee, United States v. Sealy Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966).
In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), it was said
that "[h]orizontal territorial limitations, like '[g]roup boycotts, or con-
1968]
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competitive effects, the main argument in justification is that, not-
withstanding a reduction in intrabrand competition, division of terri-
tory can lead to an increase in interbrand competition.18 This is said
to result from the fact that each manufacturer will concentrate his
efforts on the maximum penetration of his area, rather than waste
effort trying to sell in the areas assigned to his counterparts. This
concentration is said to insure keener competition between rival
brands than would be the case if the franchisees were in competition
with each other.19 The rebuttal to this justification is that if inter-
brand competition were healthy, prices would be so low that fran-
chisees would not need protection from their counterparts. If this
is so, it would appear that the attempt to limit intrabrand competi-
tion is only a ruse to eliminate at least some degree of competition
from the market as a whole.2"
Perhaps a stronger argument for territorial division can be made
when firms adopt franchising in order to enter a new market or to
prevent the failure of their businesses due to changing market con-
ditions. In such event a temporary restraint on territory might be
acceptable because of the promise of an additional product in the
market. This argument draws support from the dicta in Scaly which
seems to contemplate the situation where firms may wish to franchise
in order to meet the competition of giant merchandisers.2" As the new
brand became established, and as interbrand competition were im-
certed refusals by traders to deal' . .. are naked restraints of trade with
no purpose except stifling of competition."
18Brief for Appellee, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966).
1This argument is more often made on behalf of a manufacturer who is
attempting to justify territorial limitations placed on the retail sale of fran-
chised goods. See generally, Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112
U. PA. L. Ryv. 159, 166 (1963); Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution
under the Sherman Act, 75 HAv. L. R~v. 795, 827 (1962).
"o In Brief for Appellant, United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1966)
at 15, the Government argued:
Protection from the competitive inroads of the relatively few manu-
facturers who compose the Sealy system and who in the aggregate
compose but a small segment to the bedding industry would be futile
if the competition from other brands were as effective as competition
within the Sealy family. The principal justification suggested by ap-
pellee for the territorial restriction-that Sealy cannot attract
licensees without offering them protection against competition from
existing licensees-presupposes that the restriction is an effective
method for reducing the competitive pressures upon the manufacturers
who are party to the scheme.21388 U.S. at 358.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
proved, it would seem that intrabrand restrictions would become less
important to the franchisees and eventually could be lifted.
Sealy adds a new dimension to the law of antitrust because it is
the first case in which the agreements of firms with little market
power to divide territory have been found unlawful.2" Yet because
the Court used the presence of price fixing to find the agreements per
se unlawful, it is possible to argue that not all horizontal agreements
to divide territory need be per se unlawful. It would seem that it
might be possible to convince the Court to apply the rule of reason
favorably, especially where the success of a new entry or a group
of failing firms was at stake.
HENRY C. MCFADYEN
Civil Rights-Racially Discriminatory Employment
Practices Under Title VII
In Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Incorporated,' the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that present
differences in departmental seniority of Negroes and whites that
resulted from the company's past and intentional racially discrim-
inatory hiring policy were unlawful employment practices in viola-
tion of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Quarles was the
first such case to be litigated under Title VIi.
Prior to 1966, Phillip Morris employed Negroes only in one
of three departments covered by a collective bargaining agreement
with Local 203 of the Tobacco Workers International Union, the
prefabrication department." The jobs available in prefabrication
were generally lower paying and less desirable than those in either
" Cases behind the rule in White Motor, all involving firms with large
market power, are Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. National Lead Company, 332 U.S. 319 (1947);
Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
1279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. There were also allegations of racial
discrimination in the employer's hiring practices, employment and promotion
of supervisory personnel, and the payment of wages. The court summarily
dismissed the first two issues, and found racial discrimination in the pay-
ment of wages only as to two Negro employees.
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964).
'Negroes were also employed for seasonal work in another department,
but this was covered by a different collective bargaining agreement.
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